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TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [AORC](#) [XG](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: NATO COMES TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S.  
INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

REF: A. STATE 57920  
[1](#)B. FRENCH NON-PAPER E-MAILED TO EUR-RPM  
[1](#)C. GERMAN NON-PAPER E-MAILED TO EUR-RPM  
[1](#)D. USNATO 237

Classified By: A/PolAd A. "Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary and Comment: NATO's Political Committee met June 10 to discuss the U.S. initiative to use the OSCE Ministerial in Corfu to launch a positive, wide-ranging dialogue on European security. France and Germany used the meeting to present and solicit Allied input on previously existing national papers on the same issue. Allies were generally supportive of the U.S. approach, while some concerns were raised about parts of the French and German papers. Allies were united that future work on European security should preserve and refine existing security institutions, including the transatlantic link. All delegations conveyed their capitals' appreciation for this U.S. initiative to solicit Allied views from the outset. While there was much general support for this initiative, instructions from capitals were light on details of how to expand the areas for focus within each of the three interrelated security dimensions.

[1](#)2. (C) Several Allies requested that this initiative be further refined by having the NATO International Staff (IS) combine the U.S., French and German papers into a single document for further negotiation towards a common NATO position to be used in Corfu. France and Germany joined the U.S. in declining to support this approach. The U.S. explained that Washington did not seek a single script for Allies to use in Corfu, and that Allies' support for the start of such dialogue would be sufficient to begin the actual process at the OSCE Ministerial.

[1](#)3. (C) Allies' satisfaction with U.S. willingness to engage NATO first on this initiative has partially tempered the fear of some members of the Alliance that Washington was becoming too friendly with Moscow. In the Political Committee discussion some Allies referenced not just Corfu, but the July U.S.-Russia Moscow Summit in their remarks, expressing the hope that the U.S. would share information on both the U.S. goals for and the outcomes from the President's meetings in Moscow. End Summary and Comment.

14. (C) NATO's Political Committee met June 10 to discuss the U.S. initiative to use the OSCE Ministerial in Corfu to launch a positive, wide-ranging dialogue on European security (ref A). France and Germany used the meeting to present previously existing national papers on similar themes (refs B and C). While the discussion was formally an examination of three papers, not all delegations had instructions on the French paper and few could comment on the German paper, which had been released only the day before.

15. (C) All delegations conveyed their capitals' appreciation for this U.S. initiative to solicit Allied views from the outset. Allies were united that future work on European security should preserve and refine existing security institutions, including the transatlantic link. While there was much general support for the U.S. initiative, interventions did not include details on how to expand the areas for focus within each of the three interrelated security dimensions (Note: Most NATO delegations are not well versed in the language and mechanics of OSCE work, a fact acknowledged by some speakers when reading their interventions). Two Allies asked for a detailed U.S. elaboration on how we would proceed in the human and political-military dimensions. Allies endorsed the idea that the challenges facing us today did not exist or were less prominent during the development of the Helsinki Final Act. All thought that the goal of this initiative should be strengthening the principles of the Helsinki accords rather replacing them ("Helsinki plus, not Helsinki 2"). Most Delegations voiced caution regarding the notion of a legally-binding outcome of discussions in the OSCE, pointing to the risk that it might dilute the existing acquis.

16. (C) Many delegations also commented on the importance of unity in maintaining Alliance redlines when engaging Russia in the OSCE framework. Several Delegations raised the issue of the CFE Treaty in the context of European Security and Medvedev proposals, stressing that the CFE Treaty remained the cornerstone of European security. Delegations also addressed the NRC-dimension of the debate on European Security, with several taking the view that this issue should not become the focus of the informal NRC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Corfu;

17. (C) Some delegations defaulted to the normal conduct of NATO work, requesting that the NATO International Staff (IS) combine the U.S., French and German papers into a single document for further negotiation towards a common NATO position. The U.S. was joined by France and Germany in declining to support this approach. PolOff, remarking on the high level of support for Washington's proposal, suggested that a combined paper which would introduce Allies' positions in areas such as arms control would lead to a long and complex negotiation. This search for perfect coordination would be the enemy of the very good level of support evident from the discussion. PolOff explained that we did not seek a single script for Allies to use in Corfu, adding that the U.S. also needed time to demarche the other OSCE capitals after taking Allies' thoughts into account. He cautioned that this initiative should not divert attention or supplant important ongoing work on key issues, such as CFE. France thought that a single paper on the NATO position would not be possible before Corfu, but could be beneficial afterwards. Germany emphasized that they did not see this meeting as a preemption of discussions at Corfu.

18. (C) Overall, the meeting featured broad reaffirmation of the U.S. approach. Allies remained united on the need to preserve existing institutions, including NATO and the OSCE (with its three dimensions), as well as the transatlantic link. Allies agreed that the OSCE ministerial in Corfu was the proper venue for engaging Moscow on the topic, while recognizing that Russia would likely raise the issue at the NRC ministerial that would take place in Corfu on the same day. Enthusiasm for the U.S. approach in rolling out this initiative prompted many Allies to express interest in continuing this coordination at NATO in the future.

19. (C) Detailed reports of Allied interventions in the meeting are reported below:

-- France: The French delegate shared the US call for a broad approach and believed the CFE was a cornerstone to any discussion. He said that President Sarkozy hoped to begin a broad dialogue regarding peace and security in Europe and thought the OSCE would be the best body for this discussion. He reaffirmed currently existing security agreements but suggested that several new needs have emerged that should be included in European security arrangements. He said that, like Washington, France saw this meeting as a consultation.

-- Germany: The German representative said it was the time for a renewed focus on European security in the OSCE. He also welcomed consultations with NATO, as long as it did not pre-empt discussion in Corfu. He said the goal of the OSCE meeting in Corfu should be to create political goodwill, review existing dimensions at the OSCE, and to prepare a document for the OSCE to review at its December summit in Athens. The German delegate emphasized the importance of ultimately creating a "Helsinki Plus" agreement. He also feared that discussion on human rights would be a non-starter for Russia.

-- Greece: Speaking as the host of the upcoming OSCE summit, the Greek delegate agreed that OSCE was the best forum to discuss European security, while also welcoming NATO consultations. The Greek called for the implementation of existing agreements to build confidence, saying there are problems in all three dimensions. He argued the existing structures were sufficient to address Europe's security needs, so the goal should be "Helsinki Plus." He said that, while the meeting at Corfu would be informal, delegates could set goals for the Athens summit and task OSCE Permanent Representatives to work towards those goals.

-- United Kingdom: The UK expressed appreciation for the quality of all three national approaches, suggesting there were no apparent discrepancies among them. The UK thought the key point in the American paper was the discussion of existing commitments and institutions. London found the idea of a review "interesting," but noted it must be well-structured so as to prevent mud-slinging. They suggested the review could be conducted outside of the OSCE, perhaps by a renowned university. They further stated that discussions in the NRC could be used to complement the discussions in the OSCE. The UK appreciated the French paper's emphasis on security of Europe rather than security in Europe. London also agreed with the French analysis that Russia was seeking this opportunity to divide and rule Europe. The UK supported French red lines and noted the French ideas for Corfu were similar to those of the United States. London believed that we needed to address the Allies' own goals and priorities in the face of this Russian attempt to diminish NATO and North American influence. In doing so, the UK argued that Allies should uphold existing values, consider both hard and soft power, include the United States and Canada, and not undermine current institutions. The UK delegate said a legally-binding treaty should not be the aim of these discussions, but said it cannot yet be ruled out.

-- Norway: Norway found the papers interesting and based on the acceptance of a changing security environment. They professed the same red lines, saying that we must keep the same structures, not weaken the Helsinki agreement, and preserve the transatlantic link.

-- The Netherlands: Noting their similarities, The Netherlands suggested that the papers be somehow consolidated. The Dutch representative also noted that the previous (Finnish) Chairman in Office of the OSCE had sent a letter to the European Union containing several of the same elements as these non-papers. The Dutch Delegate said The Hague agreed with the general principles and redlines outlined in these papers. It also agreed the OSCE would be the best forum for this discussion. The Netherlands said dialogue in the NRC should not be excluded, but it would not

be optimal. The Dutch asked the United States to further clarify what suggestions it had to address the matter of human rights. Furthermore, The Hague also wanted France to clarify what would be the added value of a legally-binding mechanism to address terrorism.

-- Spain: Spain agreed with the Dutch assessment of discussing these matters in the NRC and shared their question regarding human rights.

-- Italy: The Italian suggested all three non-papers appear on the agenda at Corfu. There, he said, dialogue should focus on how best to restore mutual trust and security. Rome liked the idea of reviewing existing structures. He agreed that the OSCE would be the best forum for this dialogue, but thought that the NRC can and should be consulted. He also stressed the need to coordinate positions, going so far as to suggest using the NRC to coordinate a common position "at 29" with Russia to present in the OSCE. (Note: This drew such a poor reaction from some Allies that he later backtracked. End note).

-- Canada: Canada backed both the U.S. initiative and the pre-existing non-paper. Canada also thought there was common ground with the French and German proposals. Canada did not have problems with French redlines, but did request details on France's suggestion that the OSCE move to protect biodiversity in the Arctic.

-- Lithuania: The Lithuanian delegate pressed Allies to prepare for the discussion with a comprehensive approach and a Euro-Atlantic strategy. They therefore welcomed the U.S. call for advance coordination in NATO. Lithuania was also in favor of creating a paper to outline the NATO perspective before the Corfu talks.

-- Estonia: Tallinn agreed with the U.S. assessment of Russia's intentions. Estonia noted that all three papers were process-oriented and called for an envisioned end-state. The Estonian also remarked that any agreement must preserve existing achievements.

-- Denmark: The Danish red lines were as follows: Preserve the OSCE by improving upon existing institutions, focus on substantive rather than institutional dialogue, discuss both hard and soft security and the implementation of existing agreements, address frozen conflicts, and preserve the transatlantic link.

-- Czech Republic: The Czech delegate, describing the American paper as "excellent," said Prague liked all three papers. Prague thought NATO should create a paper discussing the NATO perspective on issues to be discussed at Corfu. This paper would not be a mere consolidation of the three working papers. In response to reluctance of some Allies, including the U.S., the Czech later accepted that a consolidation was not necessary, but thought that a separate paper should be developed to outline NATO goals. The Czech delegate expressed concern that, since consolidated positions were being prepared in the EU context, NATO Allies must do the same or risk losing out to written priorities written with the interests of other international organizations in mind.

-- Poland: Poland liked all three papers and told the United States that it could support the U.S. paper. Warsaw was keen to ensure that OSCE discussions should be complemented by NATO and the NRC. Poland said it shared the same redlines as other Allies. The Polish delegate argued that the Corfu discussion should include all elements of the Helsinki Final Act. He also asked France to provide more information on its suggested legally-binding document.

-- Romania: Romania was open to dialogue based upon the principles and red lines discussed in the three papers and in the EU. They agreed with the U.S. assessment that this dialogue should be open-ended. Romania was skeptical of the French idea regarding a legally-binding document. Bucharest believed pre-coordination for Corfu among NATO and EU allies would be appropriate, but that pre-coordination with Russia should not take place, including in the NRC. The Romanian delegate thought that any common paper on this dialogue should be written after Corfu.

-- Turkey: Ankara liked all three papers. The Turks suggested that dialogue should focus on the human and economic

dimension. They disagreed, however, with Germany's assessment that discussion on human rights would be a non-starter for Russia. In formulating a response to Russia, Ankara argued Allies should be non-confrontational and rethink using the term "red line." Turkey agreed the end goal should be "Helsinki Plus" rather than "Helsinki 2." Finally, Turkey questioned the wisdom of tasking the NATO International Staff to write a joint paper, arguing each nation should be able to present its own priorities at OSCE. They argued the NATO perspective had already been laid out in the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration.

-- Latvia: The colorful Latvian delegate Riga characterized Medvedev's proposals as non-starters and worried that, if Allies engage Russia on this matter, that they may be forced to make undesirable concessions. Riga did not want to begin this dialogue at Corfu. However, Latvia agreed that any dialogue should be open-ended and focus on new challenges such as non-state actors, terrorism, and environmental problems. Riga did not believe it would be appropriate to envision a legally-binding document from the outset. They objected to France's characterization of Russia as a key ally in security issues after its own negative assessment of Russia's intentions. Ultimately, the Latvian thought that a goal should be to achieve better implementation of existing agreements. Latvia argued for a combined U.S.)French-German paper but feared leakage of the document to the Russians.

-- Hungary: Hungary supported existing red lines and the idea of a comprehensive approach. Budapest was cautious about France's goal of a legally-binding treaty. They underlined that OSCE is the best forum for this dialogue and that allies should avoid a proliferation of these discussions in other forums.

-- Slovakia: Slovakia agreed the dialogue should concern all dimensions of the OSCE, discuss existing committees, and attempt to resolve frozen conflicts. Bratislava would like to emphasize energy security and the Slovak suggested that any new strategic concept would need to include elements from all three non-papers.

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